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IntroduCtIon
The COVID-19 pandemic has created many 
challenges for health and care services world-
wide and has led to one of the largest societal 
crises in last century. It has also been a test for 
the maturity of digital health technologies, be 
it for frontline care, surveillance or discovery 
of new strategies. In this editorial, we reflect on 
developments in service delivery, artificial intel-
ligence (AI) and data sharing instilled by the 
COVID-19 crisis and consider which conclu-
sions can be drawn so far.
ServICe delIvery
Primary care and outpatient hospital care have 
long held the promise that they could largely 
be delivered digitally, but until very recently, 
the scale of digital transformation has been 
modest. Aspirations around digital transfor-
mation had to be tempered by the reality of 
system inertia and slow speeds of adoption 
due to a multitude of barriers related to reim-
bursement, accreditation and human factors. 
For instance, in the USA, only 20% of states 
require payment parity between telemedicine 
and in- person services.1
The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically 
changed all this in a matter of weeks. The 
potential of digital health technologies to 
protect patients, clinicians and the community 
from exposure has been broadly recognised 
and catalysed the uptake of these technolo-
gies in a way not hitherto experienced.2 Many 
countries have adopted digital- first strategies, 
remote monitoring and telehealth platforms 
to enable healthcare provision without phys-
ical interactions. In the UK, primary care has 
embraced telehealth at scale and deployed a 
new digital- first pathway as a route to managing 
streaming of care to the appropriate place.3 
This would have been beyond the limits of the 
possible only a few months ago.
This rapid change was possible for three 
reasons. First, many companies could offer 
solutions by adapting software that already 
existed, rather than starting from scratch. 
The technology was sufficiently mature to 
be deployed at scale when COVID-19 struck. 
Second, many countries have relaxed privacy 
and data protection regulations for video and 
other communications technologies during 
the crisis4; the General Data Protection Regula-
tions, which apply in the UK and the European 
Union, already include a clause excepting work 
in the overwhelming public interest. Third, 
change was necessary because governments 
required that any care that does not require 
physical interaction must now be provided 
through remote consultation.5
Remote management is possible for many 
patients that are seen in primary care and 
hospital outpatient clinics. This includes 
patients with COVID-19 that can be managed 
remotely with advice on symptomatic manage-
ment and self- isolation.6 Moreover, this type of 
management can still be delivered by health-
care workers that are quarantined after infec-
tion or exposure. Telehealth tools have also 
been suggested as a form of electronic personal 
protective equipment (PPE) that can be used 
by acute care clinicians to evaluate hospitalised 
patients while avoiding physical proximity.7 
Indeed, telehealth has already been described 
as a ‘virtually perfect solution’ for COVID-19.8
The key question is whether healthcare 
services would, and should, return to predom-
inantly face- to- face interactions after the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Former barriers to 
digital transformation may return when tempo-
rary provisions for COVID-19 shift out of force. 
Some clinicians have already said that they 
would prefer to continue remote consultations 
where possible, but others have highlighted 
the need for larger structural change to avoid 
exacerbation of health inequalities.9 Some 
remote digital technologies, such as digital- 
first primary care, are under- researched, and 
there exist serious concerns regarding their 
safety.10 Much more high- quality research into 
these technologies is needed to enable our 
societies making well- informed decisions for 
the future.
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ArtIfICIAl IntellIgenCe
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic hit health systems 
worldwide, hopes were high that the widespread develop-
ment and deployment of AI within healthcare could help 
overstretched care providers through the development of 
new drugs, the optimisation of data and information flows 
and the personalised and timely delivery of care.11 With the 
pandemic in full swing, it is timely to reflect on how AI can 
help (or has helped) health systems to manage the crisis 
and to consider the role of AI as countries prepare for a 
potential second wave of infections linked to coronavirus.
At the outset of the current crisis, innovative AI- based 
analysis of social media data and news reports helped to 
predict the spread of the outbreak. Canadian company 
Blue Dot is credited with being first to recognise an unusual 
cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan before official sources 
confirmed this as COVID-19. Large amounts of data can be 
gathered and aggregated quickly from a range of sources, 
such as Twitter, Facebook, local news outlets and public 
health statistics to reconstruct and then potentially predict 
the spread and the behaviour of the COVID-19 outbreak. 
These early successes at modelling and predicting disease 
behaviour are encouraging, but questions need to be asked 
about the reliability and quality of the data that go into the 
AI.
Social media analysis could potentially be triangulated 
further with mobile phone data that capture people’s 
movements to give a real- time prediction of risk and disease 
spread. Such tracing of movement could support the public 
with complying more easily with social distancing by being 
routed away from crowded areas. Apple and Google have 
formed a partnership to develop an app to support contact 
tracing. This app takes a decentralised approach, where 
data are stored locally on each person’s phone. In the UK, 
NHSX has rejected this partnership’s design and opted 
for the development of a proprietary app where data will 
be held centrally on NHS servers.12 This raises ethical and 
privacy concerns, in particular, around the potential for 
data sharing beyond the immediate COVID-19 pandemic. 
There are also uncertainties about the actual utility of 
contact tracing due to the lack of adequate, validated risk 
models and due to the need to ensure widespread use of 
the app within the population.
Babylon Health, already a controversial player in the 
AI healthcare market prior to COVID-19, extended its 
symptom- checking app with a specific COVID-19 decision 
algorithm that might help with supporting patients in 
getting better and more targeted advice. This could poten-
tially reduce unnecessary attendances at emergency depart-
ments and community walk- in centres. However, there is as 
yet no rigorous evidence available.
A key strength and application area of AI has been 
imaging and diagnostics, and this is something that could 
be put to good use during the pandemic. For example, a 
Chinese team trained a deep learning neural network to 
identify COVID-19 from chest X- rays and to distinguish this 
from other forms of pneumonia.13 If applied successfully 
in clinical practice, such an AI- supported approach could 
help protect healthcare staff and speed up the process of 
isolating and potentially tracking patients. However, care 
needs to be taken with results reported at this early stage. 
A review of 31 diagnostic and prediction models found that 
all of the models were at high risk of introducing bias and 
that the accuracy and performance estimates were likely 
to be overly optimistic.14 In order to speed up training of 
algorithms and to enhance their performance, shared data 
repositories should be built up globally, and the transpar-
ency of reporting needs to be enhanced.
Lastly, AI has the potential to support the treatment of 
COVID-19 through the development of new drugs and the 
redeployment of existing drugs. For example, large numbers 
of research papers accessible through the COVID-19 Open 
Research Database can be analysed quickly using machine 
learning to extract relevant knowledge about drugs that 
might be beneficial for the treatment of COVID-19. AI has 
also been used in the race for the development of vaccines 
and treatments. Hong Kong- based company Insilico Medi-
cine reported that it had developed six new molecules that 
could potentially halt viral replication.
AI has potential to help health systems to fight COVID-19 
through these initiatives around predicting and reducing 
spread, and by supporting diagnosis and treatment. There 
are open questions about data quality, transferability of 
results across settings and health systems, the performance 
of algorithms when actually used in clinical systems, and 
about access to data and protection of privacy. The crisis 
provides us with an opportunity to gain a glimpse of the 
future and to ponder these questions.
dAtA ShArIng
The rapid responses to COVID-19 have substantial implica-
tions for how healthcare data are used. Understandably, it 
has been a priority to make data quickly available to support 
disease surveillance and to inform operational require-
ments such as hospital capacity planning and resource 
management. There is also a broad range of urgent 
research needs, such as studies of virus mutations, patient 
risk factors, clinical outcomes and drug trials.15 Ultimately, 
the aim was to have data- driven public policy decisions 
on testing and tracing strategy, health system manage-
ment, targeted isolation advice, social distancing rules and 
freedom of movement. Achieving these various objectives 
necessitates a rich collection of (usually pseudonymised) 
patient data, including demographics, prior conditions and 
medications, social circumstances, genome analysis, labora-
tory test results, diagnostic imaging and clinical narratives.
Analytics that address the whole picture will need to 
link data from multiple organisations and health record 
systems, posing challenges to enabling safe linkage while 
maintaining information security and managing the risks of 
reidentification.16 In the UK, an exceptional legal basis has 
been provided for this by the Secretary of State for Health 
and Social Care activating the Health Service (Control of 
Patient Information) Regulations, which requires affected 
organisations to ‘process confidential patient information… 
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where the confidential patient information to be processed 
is required for a Covid-19 Purpose and will be processed 
solely for that COVID-19 Purpose’ (italics added).17
How is this viewed by the general public? Surveys often 
find that sharing of health data by clinicians for legitimate 
care purposes is overwhelmingly trusted, but some studies 
have shown distrust in research use by pharmaceutical 
companies or academics even when data are anonymised.18 
In the height of the pandemic, it is very likely that such 
cautions are mentally suspended by citizens, rather like the 
almost universal practice of hasty and uncritical acceptance 
of software licensing terms and conditions so that you can 
get on with using the product. However, with the ‘genie out 
of the bottle’, will governments, academics and industry be 
keen to return to the stricter regime of ‘normal’ informa-
tion governance? Will there be a genuine citizen dialogue 
to see if there is a ‘new normal’ of easier data access? Or is 
there a risk of democratic nations semiconsciously drifting 
towards the kinds of citizen data exploitation seen in coun-
tries with repressive administrations? In an era of increasing 
concerns about the seemingly uncheckable powers of global 
tech companies, the rise of antiexpert right- wing populism 
and the anticipated economic catastrophe following the 
pandemic, these are serious issues that demand transparent 
ethical consideration.
dISCuSSIon
The COVID-19 crisis has led to extraordinary rapid transfor-
mations of service delivery using telehealth technologies, 
thus showing that these technologies had already reached 
the level of maturity required to be deployed within health-
care systems at pace and scale: they were waiting in the 
wings. It is quite conceivable that digital consultations will 
remain the norm even when this pandemic is over. The 
pandemic has also led to rapid changes in the extent to 
which health data are being shared, both for direct care and 
for secondary purposes. It is less obvious, however, how the 
‘emergency’ governance of health data would sustain after 
the crisis without causing a confrontation with public trust. 
For AI, finally, there appear to be numerous opportunities. 
However, few concrete achievements have been reported in 
the few months that we are now into the pandemic. It is yet 
unclear whether AI technologies have sufficient readiness 
to save the world when they are most needed, but no doubt, 
the near future will tell us more. Despite the pace of current 
changes, it is pertinent that we capture and share what can 
be learnt from these pandemic times. To be continued.
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